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ABSTRACT
At the beginning of his famous paper “Moral Luck,” Thomas Nagel notes that it is
intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is beyond their
control. He then argues that most, if not all, of what people do is beyond their control.
Thus, Nagel concludes that individuals must deny that people cannot be morally assessed
for what is beyond their control, alter the way they think about morality, or abandon the
belief that moral assessment is possible. I contend that one’s best option is to alter the
way one thinks about morality and therefore draw from the work of Michael J.
Zimmerman to construct and defend a counterfactual theory of moral assessment which
looks not only at the kind of person one is and the kinds of actions one performs but also
at the kind of person one would be and the kinds of actions one would perform in certain
counterfactual circumstances.

In closing, I explain why one who accepts my

counterfactual theory of moral assessment has reason to prefer virtue ethical theories of
morality to their consequentialist and deontological counterparts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the television series Criminal Minds, members of the Behavioral Analysis Unit
(BAU) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) attempt to find and apprehend serial
killers by psychologically profiling the suspects. In one particular episode, the serial
killer turns out to be comic book artist Jonny McHale, who turns violent only after
witnessing the brutal murder of his fiancé and suffering a psychotic break.

In the

episode’s closing scene, two members of the BAU, Emily Prentiss and David Rossi, have
the following conversation:

Rossi:
Prentiss:

Rossi:
Prentiss:
Rossi:
Prentiss:
Rossi:
Prentiss:

Something wrong?
He’s the first unsub [unknown subject] I’ve worked that
wasn’t a bad guy, you know? Six months ago Jonny
McHale was just a regular person.
Every unsub is ill on some level. Most can’t help what
they do any more than Jonny could.
But he went from successful writer and artist to brutal killer
in six months.
He suffered an unbelievable tragedy.
I know; I get it.
So what’s bugging you?
It just makes me wonder, aren’t we all capable of becoming
something like that?

As her statement indicates, Prentiss recognizes that were she to undergo the same
experiences as McHale, she too might turn violent.

Now, this fact might be less
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disturbing to Prentiss had McHale done something to put himself at risk of undergoing
such experiences,1 but he did not. McHale was simply unlucky.
Given that McHale was unlucky to undergo the experiences he did and that
undergoing those experiences caused him to be a serial killer, McHale was unlucky to be
a serial killer. Furthermore, assuming that being a serial killer is morally blameworthy, it
follows that McHale was also unlucky to be morally blameworthy. 2

Although this

argument is valid and the premises appear true, the conclusion strikes many as false.
According to them, moral responsibility and therefore moral praise and blame are
incompatible with luck.3
I contend that the problem with the preceding argument is the assumption that
being a serial killer is morally blameworthy. Although those who are responsible for
being serial killers are morally blameworthy, it does not follow that those who are not
responsible for being serial killers are morally blameworthy. 4 As I see it, one is morally
blameworthy for being a serial killer only if one is responsible for being a serial killer
(i.e., only if one is not unlucky to be a serial killer). Thus, McHale, who is unlucky to be
a serial killer, is not morally blameworthy for being a serial killer on my account. 5

1

Although it is not clear to me how one would put oneself at risk of suffering a psychotic break or
becoming a serial killer, I assume that it is possible to do such a thing. Even if it is not, the point is simply
that there are certain morally blameworthy character traits that one can avoid developing by not putting
oneself in certain circumstances.
2
Because I assume that being a serial killer and being morally blameworthy are bad, I describe McHale as
unlucky. If, however, one believes that being a serial killer and being morally blameworthy are good, one
would describe McHale as lucky.
3
The suggestion that moral responsibility is incompatible with luck can be found in numerous authors (e.g.,
Augustine 1961: 33 and Reid 1983: 352).
4
Even if it is useful to blame those who are not responsible for being serial killers, my contention is that
they do not deserve blame.
5
A similar argument and reply could be made regarding each of McHale’s particular actions. For instance,
one could argue that if McHale was unlucky to undergo the experiences he did and that undergoing those
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If a serial killer like McHale is not morally blameworthy, however, then who is?
This paper attempts to answer that question. I begin by explaining what moral luck is
and why Thomas Nagel believes the possibility of moral assessment depends on its
existence. I then draw from Michael J. Zimmerman’s work to provide a counterfactual
account of moral assessment that does not depend on the existence of moral luck. In
conclusion, I argue that that counterfactual account of moral assessment provides reason
to prefer virtue ethical theories of morality to consequentialist and deontological theories.

experiences caused him to kill a particular individual x, then McHale was unlucky to kill x. Assuming that
killing x is morally blameworthy, it would follow that McHale was unlucky to be morally blameworthy.
The problem with this argument is the assumption that killing x is morally blameworthy, for although those
who are responsible for killing x are morally blameworthy, it does not follow that those who are not
responsible for killing x are morally blameworthy. Instead, one is morally blameworthy for killing x only if
one is responsible for killing x.
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II. THE PROBLEM OF MORAL LUCK
Nagel’s Argument
In the famous paper “Moral Luck,” Thomas Nagel asserts, “Prior to reflection it is
intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or
for what is due to factors beyond their control.” 6 He also contends that “nothing or
almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control.” 7

Taken

together, these statements produce an argument against the possibility of moral
assessment.

The Problem of Moral Luck
(P1) (The Control Principle) Agents cannot be morally assessed for what is not
within their control.
(P2) There is nothing within agents’ control.
(C)
Therefore, agents cannot be morally assessed.

Given that the argument is valid, those hoping to deny (C) must deny either (P1) or (P2).
In “Moral Luck,” Nagel defends (P2), thereby suggesting that others must abandon either
the control principle by admitting that individuals can be morally assessed for what is
beyond their control or their belief that moral assessment is possible. 8 Because neither of
these options is attractive, I argue that one should, if possible, deny (P2).

6

Nagel 2007: 355.
Nagel 2007: 356.
8
If agents can be morally assessed for what is beyond their control, then moral luck exists.
7
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In what follows, I present Nagel’s defense of (P2). Although I admit it reveals
that many things are beyond agents’ control, I contend that it fails to establish the
stronger claim that everything is beyond agents’ control. Thus, I assert that neither (P1)
nor the possibility of moral assessment need be abandoned. Nevertheless, I believe
Nagel’s defense of (P2) does highlight problems with the way morality is ordinarily
assessed. As he points out, our basic moral attitudes, though determined by what is
actual, are also threatened by that actuality, 9 for if the only thing subject to moral
assessment is what one actually has within one’s control, there is little, if anything,
subject to moral assessment. This makes comparative moral assessment difficult if not
impossible. In order to make comparative moral assessment easier, I argue that such
assessment should be based not only on the kind of person one is and the kind of actions
one performs, but also on the kind of person one would be and the kind of actions one
would perform in certain counterfactual circumstances. In other words, I contend that
moral assessment should be based not only on an individual’s character and actions in the
actual world, but also on his or her character and actions in certain possible worlds.

Four Kinds of Moral Luck
In defense of (P2), Nagel presents three kinds of moral luck (viz., resultant,
circumstantial, and constitutive luck) to illustrate that the effects of one’s action, one’s
actions themselves, and one’s character dispositions, all of which ordinarily play a role in

9

Nagel 2007: 362.

Spelman, Jonathan, 2010, UMSL, p. 10
moral assessment, are beyond one’s control. Lastly, Nagel presents a fourth kind of
moral luck (viz., causal luck) to illustrate that everything is beyond one’s control.
The first type of luck Nagel presents is resultant luck, the type of luck that is
present whenever moral assessment is affected by “the way in which one’s actions and
projects turn out.”10 For example, imagine a scenario in which an individual drives
through a red light. Although there are some cases in which the driver’s doing so might
be harmless, there are other cases in which the driver’s doing so will be quite harmful.
Ordinarily, the more harm one causes, the more blame one receives, so the more harm the
driver causes (e.g., if he or she runs over a child), the more blame he or she will receive.
Conversely, the less harm the driver causes, the less blame he or she will receive. 11
Assessing the driver in this way (i.e., making blame proportionate to the degree of harm
caused), however, is to make moral assessment of the driver depend on something
beyond his or her control, thereby violating the control principle. Thus, insofar as the
effects of the driver’s driving through a red light are beyond his or her control, they
should not play a role in the way he or she is morally assessed. 12 In the end, this
illustrates that if the effects of an individual’s actions are beyond his or her control, moral
assessment of him or her should not take those effects into account. 13

10

Nagel 2007: 357.
Ibid.
12
There may, in some cases, be reasons to blame a driver who both drives through a red light and runs over
a child more than a driver who simply drives through a red light. For instance, in those cases where a
driver both drives through a red light and runs over a child, the driver misses or ignores two “signs” not to
drive through the red light (i.e., the red light and the child). In those cases where a driver simply drives
through a red light, however, the driver misses or ignores only one “sign” not to drive through the red light
(i.e., the red light). I assume that it is more egregious to miss or ignore two “signs” than it is to miss or
ignore one.
13
Although the effects of an individual’s actions should not be taken into consideration when assessing the
morality of that individual, it does not follow that the effects of an individual’s action should never be taken
11
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A second kind of luck is what Nagel calls circumstantial luck, the kind of luck
that is present whenever moral assessment is affected by the situations one faces. If, for
example, whether or not one becomes a Nazi officer depends on events outside one’s
control, circumstantial luck is present. Nagel writes, “Someone who was an officer in a
concentration camp might have led a quiet and harmless life if the Nazis had never come
to power in Germany. And someone who led a quiet and harmless life in Argentina
might have become an officer in a concentration camp if he had not left Germany for
business reasons in 1930.”14 This example illustrates that one’s actions often depends on
one’s circumstances, and because one’s circumstances are often beyond one’s control,
one’s actions are often beyond one’s control. In such cases, one’s actions should not play
a role in morally assessment.
A third type of luck is what Nagel calls constitutive luck, the type of luck that is
present whenever moral assessment is affected by one’s character dispositions. Imagine,
for example, an individual named Allen who is passed up for a job promotion that is
deservedly given to Brian.

Allen, though envious of Brian, congratulates Brian

nonetheless.15 According to Kant, the way in which an individual is morally assessed
depends upon the goodness of his or her will, and the goodness of an individual’s will
depends on whether he or she acts from duty (i.e., from the categorical imperative). 16 To

into consideration when assessing the morality of that action. That is, the fact that the effects of a particular
individual’s driving through a red light should not be taken into consideration when assessing the morality
of the driver does not mean that the effects of driving through red lights should not be taken into
consideration when assessing the morality of driving through red lights.
14
Nagel 2007: 356.
15
This example is drawn from Nagel 2007: 359. I assume that because of Allen’s envy, it is impossible for
him to offer sincere congratulations.
16
Kant 1993: 12.
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perform an action from duty is to perform it out of respect for the moral law, specifically
because the maxim of that action is universalizable. 17 Therefore, the way in which an
individual is morally assessed on Kant’s account depends upon whether he or she
performs his or her actions because the maxims of those actions are universalizable.
Assuming then that Allen congratulates Brian because the maxim of his action (viz.,
congratulate those who receive deserved promotions) is universalizable, Allan acts from
duty and therefore rightly on Kant’s account.18 According to Nagel, however, acting
from duty is not sufficient for acting rightly, for on his account, right action requires that
one also have the appropriate accompanying attitude.

So although Allen correctly

congratulates Brian, Allen is nevertheless blameworthy given the wrongness of his
envy.19
Nagel goes on to contend that character dispositions, like Allen’s envy, are at
least influenced, if not determined, by one’s biological makeup or upbringing and are
therefore beyond one’s control. This affects moral assessment in at least two ways. 20
First, insofar as moral evaluation of agents’ behavior depends on certain internal
dispositions, the fact that agents’ dispositional attitudes are beyond their control makes it
such that moral assessment will be grounded in some lucky feature of their constitution.

17

Kant 1993: 13.
According to Kant, simply acting in accordance with duty is not sufficient for right action (Kant 1993:
10).
19
Nagel 2007: 359.
20
This affects moral assessment in at least two ways because at least two kinds of character dispositions
influence moral assessment. On one hand, there are internal dispositions. Internal dispositions are
dispositions to have certain attitudes. For example, some individuals are more envious than others, a fact
that influences the way they are morally assessed. On the other hand, there are external dispositions.
External dispositions are dispositions to perform certain actions. For example, some individuals take more
risks than others, a fact that will influence their behavior and therefore the way they are morally assessed. I
use the word “constitution” and the phrase “character dispositions” to refer to both kinds of dispositions.
18
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Moral assessment of Allen, for example, is grounded in a lucky feature of his constitution
insofar as his envy is a product of his genes or the way in which he was raised. Second,
because moral evaluation of agents depends on their actions and agents’ actions depend
on certain external dispositions, the fact that agents’ external dispositions are beyond
their control makes it such that moral assessment of agents will be grounded in some
lucky feature of their constitution. For example, an individual disposed to alcoholism
will have less control over his or her drinking than an individual not disposed to
alcoholism, and insofar as the excessive drinking caused by alcoholism diminishes one’s
control over one’s actions, the individual disposed to alcoholism will have less control his
or her actions than the individual not disposed to alcoholism. Thus, moral assessment of
the individual disposed to alcoholism will, at least in part, be grounded in a lucky feature
of his or her constitution.

Ultimately, however, because individuals should not be

morally assessed for what is beyond their control and their constitutions or character
dispositions are beyond their control, moral assessment should not be grounded in their
constitutions or character dispositions.
The fourth and final kind of luck presented by Nagel is causal luck, the kind of
luck that is present insofar as the will and therefore all human action is causally
determined.

As Nagel points out, “Everything seems to result from the combined

influence of factors, antecedent and posterior to action, that are not within the agent’s
control.”21 If, as the control principle suggests, agents cannot be morally assessed for

21

Nagel 2007: 360.
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what is beyond their control and everything is beyond their control, then agents cannot be
morally assessed.

Conclusion
Given the control principle on which agents cannot be held responsible for what is
not within their control, the existence of resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive luck
requires abandoning the way individuals are ordinarily morally assessed. Moreover, the
existence of causal luck requires abandoning moral assessment altogether. Thus, on
Nagel’s account, preserving the possibility of moral assessment requires one to reject the
control principle. In other words, preserving the possibility of moral assessment requires
holding agents responsible for things that are not within their control. In what follows, I
argue that preserving moral assessment does not require holding agents responsible for
things that are not within their control. Then, after providing a counterfactual theory of
moral assessment that can handle the problems posed by resultant, circumstantial, and
constitutive luck, I contend that that theory provides reasons to prefer virtue ethical
theories of morality to consequentialist or deontological theories.
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III. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
In a paper entitled “Taking Luck Seriously,” Michael J. Zimmerman attempts to
explain how both the control principle and the possibility of moral assessment can be
preserved in spite of the worries caused by luck. Recognizing that moral responsibility is
incompatible with luck, Zimmerman admits that one should not be held morally
responsible for those character dispositions, actions, or effects that are beyond one’s
control. Realizing, however, that there is a great deal beyond one’s control, Zimmerman
expands the scope of one’s responsibility by arguing that one can be held morally
responsible for the character dispositions one would have had, actions one would have
performed, and effects one would have produced, had they not been beyond one’s
control. In other words, Zimmerman argues that even if an individual is not morally
responsible for his or her actual character dispositions, actions, or effects because they
are beyond his or her control, he or she is, nevertheless, responsible for his or her
counterfactual character dispositions, actions, and effects.
To accomplish this, Zimmerman begins by draws two distinctions, one between
three kinds of judgments (viz., aretaic, deontic, and hypological judgments) and another
between the degree and scope of one’s responsibility. By drawing a distinction between
aretaic, deontic, and hypological judgments, Zimmerman is able to separate questions
about virtuous character and right action from questions about responsibility. Then, by
focusing in on questions about responsibility, Zimmerman is able to argue, contra Nagel,
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that it is possible to preserve both the possibility of moral assessment and the control
principle.

Aretaic, Deontic, and Hypological Judgments
In order to preserve both the possibility of moral assessment and the control
principle in spite of the problems posed by luck, Zimmerman begins by distinguishing
aretaic and deontic judgments from hypological ones. 22 Aretaic judgments, according to
Zimmerman, are judgments about character, particularly virtue and vice.23 Thus, aretaic
judgments are made of individuals, and the making of such judgments requires the
evaluation of one’s character dispositions. For example, an individual disposed to saving
drowning swimmers is deemed virtuous while an individual disposed to ignoring them is
deemed vicious.
Deontic judgments are judgments about actions, particularly their rightness and
wrongness.24 Thus, deontic judgments are made of behaviors, and the making of such
judgments requires the evaluation of the way actions are produced and the effects that
result. Saving a drowning swimmer, for example, is deemed right while ignoring a
drowning swimmer is deemed wrong.

22

Zimmerman 2002: 554.
Ibid.
24
Zimmerman claims that “deontic judgments constitute a type of act evaluation,” but he also claims that
they constitute a type of agent evaluation (Ibid.). While I agree with Zimmerman’s suggestion that deontic
judgments constitute a type of act evaluation, I disagree with his suggestion that they also constitute a type
of agent evaluation.
23
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Finally, hypological judgments are judgments about responsibility, particularly
laudability and culpability. 25 Zimmerman himself introduces the word “hypological,”
which he draws from the Greek word “ύπόλογος” meaning “held accountable or liable.” 26
Hypological judgments, like aretaic judgments, are made of individuals, and the making
of such judgments requires the evaluation of one’s control.

More specifically, the

making of such judgments requires determining whether or not an individual has control
over a particular thing and, if he or she does, determining the extent to which he or she
has control over that thing. Hypological judgments can be made about individuals with
respect to their character dispositions or their behaviors. Consequently, hypological
judgments can be made about virtue and vice or right and wrong action. For example,
whether one has the disposition to save drowning swimmers may or may not be within
one’s control. If it is, then one is laudable for having it and culpable for not. If it is not,
then one is neither laudable nor culpable either way. Similarly, whether one saves a
drowning swimmer may or may not be within one’s control. If it is, then one is laudable
for doing so and culpable for not. If it is not, then one is neither laudable nor culpable
either way.

Degree and Scope of Responsibility
Having distinguished between aretaic, deontic, and hypological judgments,
Zimmerman turns his attention to distinguishing between degree and scope of

25
26

Ibid.
Ibid.
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responsibility.27 To do so, Zimmerman presents an example in which two assassins,
Georg and George, plot to kill Henrik and Henry respectively.28 Zimmerman assumes
that the mental and physical lives of Georg and George are identical and that the only
difference between the two is that the bullet Georg fires at Henrik hits and kills a bird
while the bullet George fires at Henry hits and kills Henry.

Although it is clear,

according to Zimmerman, that George is responsible for something that Georg is not (i.e.,
the death of a person), it does not follow that that George is any more blameworthy than
Georg. In fact, given that the only differences between the two assassins are the effects
of their actions, something outside their control, Zimmerman is inclined to describe them
as equally blameworthy. 29
In order to explain how the two men could be equally blameworthy when one is
responsible for killing a man and the other is not, Zimmerman draws a distinction
between degree and scope of responsibility. On Zimmerman’s account, one’s degree of
responsibility depends on the degree of control one has over a particular characteristic of
the world (e.g., one’s character dispositions, circumstances, actions, or the effects of
one’s actions).30 In the example, Georg and George are described as having identical
mental and physical lives. I take it that Zimmerman also assumes that they arrive at their
identical mental and physical lives by identical processes. So, assuming Georg and
George freely choose to be assassins, the two not only have the same degree of control

27

Zimmerman 2002: 560.
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Zimmerman 2002: 562. Here I have noted that one’s actions themselves might be beyond one’s control
(e.g., in those cases where one misspeaks). Although Nagel and Zimmerman ignore this possibility,
Santiago Amaya brought it to my attention.
28

Spelman, Jonathan, 2010, UMSL, p. 19
over their becoming assassins but also have some non-zero degree of control over their
becoming assassins, for insofar as Georg and George are free to be assassins, they can
avoid becoming assassins. If scientists program Georg and George to be assassins,
however, then although the two have the same degree of control over their becoming
assassins, they do not have some non-zero degree of control over their becoming
assassins, for insofar as Georg and George are programmed to be assassins, they cannot
avoid becoming assassins.
Whereas one’s degree of responsibility depends on the degree of control one has
over a particular characteristic of the world, one’s scope of responsibility depends on
what characteristics of the world one has control over. 31 In Zimmerman’s example,
Georg and George are assumed to have the same, non-zero degree control over their
character dispositions, circumstances, and actions.

Thus, the scope of their control

extends to their character dispositions, circumstances and actions.

The question,

however, is whether the scope of their control extends to the effects of their actions.
Whether one believes Georg and George have control over the effects of their
actions will depend on one’s theory of responsibility. As I see it, what it means for one to
have control over the effects of one’s actions is for the actual effects of one’s actions to
match up with one’s intended effects. 32 On this view, because Georg fails to kill, the

31

Ibid.
Earlier I argued that one is not morally responsible for what is beyond one’s control, and here I argue that
one’s effects are beyond one’s control unless they match up with one’s intended effects. Thus, my account
of moral responsibility entails that individuals are not morally responsible for the unintended effects of
their actions. For example, my account of moral responsibility entails that individuals are not morally
responsible for unintentionally driving through red lights, even if their doing so causes injury to others.
Given that unintentionally driving through red lights is blameworthy, however, especially when doing so
causes injury to others, one might object to my account of moral responsibility. In response, I would admit
32
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effects of Georg’s action are not under his control.

Alternatively, because George

succeeds in killing Henry, the effects of George’s action are under his control.
Because I believe that what it means for one to have control over the effects of
one’s actions is for the effects of one’s actions to match up with one’s intended effects, I
believe that what it means for one to have control over one’s constitution is for one’s
constitution to match up with one’s intended constitution. Similarly, what it means for
one to have control over one’s circumstances is for one’s circumstances to match up with
one’s intended circumstances, and what it means for one to have control over one’s
actions is for one’s actions to match up with one’s intended actions.

Moral Responsibility
Because the purpose of moral assessment is to determine one’s laudability or
culpability,33 and because one cannot be laudable or culpable for something that is
beyond one’s control, 34 determining one’s laudability or culpability requires determining
what is within one’s control. Hypological judgments serve this function by picking out
the scope and degree of one’s control and therefore the scope and degree of one’s
responsibility.

that unintentionally driving through red lights is blameworthy but contend that it is not morally but
epistemically blameworthy. I believe this holds true for all unintentional negligent acts. Assuming I am
right about that, my account of moral responsibility need not hold individuals responsible for the
unintended effects of their actions in order to explain the blameworthiness of unintentional negligent acts.
33
Although I am working under the assumption that this is the sole purpose of moral assessment, I am
willing to admit that there may be others.
34
Though inappropriate, it is pragmatic to praise or blame an individual whose behavior is beyond his
control provided praising or blaming him is capable of altering his future behavior. In such cases, however,
the object of praise or blame is the action, not the individual. Individuals are the appropriate object of
praise or blame only in those cases where their behavior is within their control.
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Judgments about the scope of one’s control pick out what one is responsible for.
If a particular disposition, action, or effect is beyond one’s control, then one is not
responsible for it. If a particular disposition, action, or effect is within the scope of one’s
control, however, then one is responsible for it. Thus, if a particular disposition, action,
or effect is beyond one’s control, then that disposition, action, or effect should not play a
role in the way one is morally assessed. If, however, a particular disposition, action, or
effect is within one’s control, then that disposition, action, or effect should play a role in
the way one is morally assessed.

Consequently, an individual is subject to moral

assessment only if there is at least one disposition, action, or effect that is not beyond his
or her control. The more dispositions, actions, and effects that are within one’s control,
the more dispositions, actions, and effects one is responsible for.
Judgments about the degree of one’s control pick out the degree to which one is
responsible for those dispositions, actions, and effects within one’s control.

If a

particular disposition, action, or effect is beyond one’s control, then one does not have a
non-zero degree of control over it. If, however, a particular disposition, action, or effect
is within one’s control, then one does have a non-zero degree of control over it. The
greater the amount of control one has over a particular disposition, action, or effect, the
greater the degree of control one has over that disposition, action, or effect. What is
more, the greater the degree of control one has over a disposition, action, or effect, the
greater the influence that disposition, action, or effect has on the way one is morally
assessed.
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Because aretaic and deontic judgments cannot be made about agents whose
dispositions, actions, and effects are beyond their control, 35 hypological judgments must
be made prior to aretaic and deontic judgments. Thus, hypological judgments play a
crucial role in moral assessment. Nevertheless, the mere fact that an agent has control
over a particular characteristic of the world does not mean that the agent’s relationship to
that characteristic of the world is a morally significant one. For example, although an
individual might have control over when and how he eats a particular bowl of ice cream,
it is not the case that his or her decision is therefore morally significant.
Ordinarily, the character dispositions one has, the actions one performs, and the
effects one produces are all morally relevant features of one’s life. The circumstances or
situations one faces, however, are not. The reason for this is that the situations one faces
are unforeseen, unintended, or intended effects of one’s actions. If they are unforeseen or
unintended effects of one’s actions, then they are beyond one’s control, and one is not
responsible for them. If they are intended effects of one’s actions, however, then one is
already responsible for them as effects. Assuming, therefore, that one is responsible for
the effects of one’s actions, one should not also be responsible for the situations one
faces, for if one were, then one would be responsible for the situations one faces qua
effects and qua situations. Thus, I assume that the situations one faces (i.e., one’s
circumstances) should not be evaluated in moral assessment to avoid double counting.
In the end, the morally relevant features of one’s life are one’s character
dispositions, one’s actions, and the effects of one’s actions, provided these things are
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I will argue for this claim later.
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within one’s control. 36 These morally relevant features of one’s life play a determining
role in comparative moral assessment, and therefore comparative moral assessment of
any two individuals having the same non-zero degree of control over these features of a
world is relatively straightforward. Imagine, for example, two brothers, Daniel and
David, each of whom has a rock and control over whether or not he throws that rock at
his brother.

Because the scope and degree of their responsibility is identical, any

difference in their behavior will generate a difference in the way they are morally
assessed. Consequently, if Daniel throws his rock at David while David refrains, the two
brothers will be assessed differently.
Although comparative moral assessment of any two individuals having the same
non-zero degree of control over certain characteristics of the world is relatively
straightforward, comparative moral assessment of any two individuals not having the
same non-zero degree of control over certain characteristics of a world is significantly
less so. The purpose of the following section is to demonstrate that such assessment,
though difficult, is nevertheless possible, and to do so, I draw on Zimmerman’s
discussion of how to conduct moral assessment in cases of resultant, circumstantial, and
constitutive luck.

36

Zimmerman disagrees with this assessment, writing, “I have said that I subscribe to the view that we
cannot be responsible for what is not in our control . . . In my view . . . an agent exercises control directly
over his choices . . . and indirectly over the consequences of his choices” (Zimmerman 2002: 564). On
Zimmerman’s account, therefore, the only morally relevant features of one’s life are one’s choices. As a
result, Zimmerman argues that individuals are either responsible for their choices or responsible “tout
court,” where to be responsible tout court is not to be responsible “for anything” but to be responsible “in
virtue of something” (Zimmerman 2002: 564-565 [emphasis in original]). Thus, Zimmerman contends that
individuals are responsible not for their dispositions to choose wrongly but rather in virtue of their
dispositions to choose wrongly. In the end, it seems that the disagreement between Zimmerman and me on
this issue is verbal. Nevertheless, I should note that I do not intend for my account of moral responsibility
to be identical to Zimmerman’s but only to follow his in certain significant respects.
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IV. A THEORY OF MORAL ASSESSMENT
Resultant Luck
The existence of resultant luck makes it such that moral assessment should not be
influenced by the uncontrolled effects of one’s actions. Nevertheless, I see no reason
why moral assessment should not be influenced by the controlled effects of one’s actions
or the counterfactual effects one’s actions would produce were they controlled.
In arguing for this position, I want to return to Zimmerman’s example of the two
assassins, Georg and George, both of whom not only have the same non-zero degree of
control over their constitutions, circumstances, and actions but also have identical
constitutions, face identical circumstances, and perform identical actions. 37 Were Georg
and George to have the same non-zero degree of control over the effects of their actions
and produce the same effects, it would be appropriate for one to assess the two assassins
identically. Georg and George do not have the same non-zero degree of control over the
effect of their actions, however, for although the scope of Georg’s control, and therefore
his responsibility, does not extend to the effects of his action, George’s does. What is
more, the actions performed by Georg and George do not have the same effects, for
although Georg does not kill his target, George does.

37

Throughout the paper, the word “action” refers to a behavior directed at an end. Therefore, two
individuals who behave identically in pursuit of identical ends are described as acting identically even if
only one of the two achieves his or her end. Consequently, Georg and Georg are described as acting
identically even though only George achieves his end.
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These dissimilarities between Georg and George make it unclear how to assess
the two in comparison with one another. As I see it, there are at least three options. First,
one could simply ignore the effects produced by the assassins, choosing to base moral
assessment of the two on their character dispositions and actions, which are within their
control. The virtue of this method of assessment is that it deems Georg and George
equally culpable, which seems appropriate. The problem with this method of moral
assessment, however, is that it ignores morally relevant information, particularly the fact
that George kills Henry.
While I admit that being disposed to kill and attempting to kill are blameworthy,
it seems that what makes them blameworthy is the fact that they actually result in killing.
Consequently, I take it that if being disposed to kill or attempting to kill did not result in
killing, each would seem significantly less blameworthy. Thus, I contend that George’s
killing Henry is an important fact that should not be ignored.
This problem with the first method of moral assessment motivates a second. The
second method does not ignore effects of George’s action because they are within his
control, but it does ignore the effects of Georg’s action, which are not. On this method of
moral assessment, George would be responsible for his character, actions, and effects
while Georg would only be responsible for his character and actions. The virtue of this
method is that it takes into account the fact that George kills Henry. In taking that
information into account, however, this method makes moral assessment of the two
assassins incommensurable.
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When Georg and George are compared simply with respect to their characters and
actions, it is clear why they are equally culpable.

When the fact that George is

responsible for killing Henry is added to that information, it is no longer clear whether
Georg and George should be assessed identically. The fact that George is responsible for
killing Henry seems to make him more culpable than Georg, but if George is more
culpable than Georg, then one must abandon the intuitively plausible suggestion that the
two should be assessed identically.

Ultimately, it is unclear what to do with the

additional fact that George is responsible for killing Henry. Were there a comparable fact
about Georg’s responsibility, then George’s responsibility for killing Henry would not be
problematic, but lacking such a fact, it is. 38
The problem with the second method of moral assessment leads to a third and
final method that takes into account not only the effects of George’s action but also the
counterfactual effects of Georg’s action, specifically the effects George would have
produced had they been within his control. On this method of moral assessment, the
character, actions, and effects (i.e., Georg’s counterfactual effects and George’s actual
effects) of both assassins would undergo evaluation. This view not only captures the
intuition that Georg and George are equally culpable but also has the benefit of grounding
their culpability in effects rather than in character dispositions or actions themselves.
This view also alleviates the problem with the second view by providing an equal amount
of information about both assassins on which to base comparative moral assessment.
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This problem might be epistemic, for the fact that there is more information about how to assess George
than there is about how to assess Georg makes it easier to assess George than Georg, but it does not
necessarily make the former any more culpable than the latter.

Spelman, Jonathan, 2010, UMSL, p. 27
The method of assessment I have advanced here is capable of accurately capturing
one’s intuitions about moral laudability and culpability not only in the case described but
also other cases such as the one described earlier in which two individuals drive through
red lights but only one of the two hits a child. In that case, although only one of the
drivers hits a child, the two are nevertheless equally blameworthy in the same way that
Georg and George are equally blameworthy insofar as their actions would produce
similar effects in counterfactual situations.

Circumstantial Luck
The existence of circumstantial luck makes it such that moral assessment should
not be influenced by the uncontrolled actions one performs. However, I see no reason
why moral assessment should not be influenced by the controlled actions one performs or
the counterfactual actions one would perform were one in control of them.
To explain why, I want to consider an example similar to Zimmerman’s original
example but altered in such a way that Georg is no longer resultantly lucky but
circumstantially lucky. In the example, Georg not only fails to kill Henrik but also fails
to fire at Henrik because of a sudden urge to sneeze or because an object blocks his line
of sight.39
Although this new example introduces an additional difference between Georg
and George, Zimmerman argues that the two remain equally culpable, 40 for although the
scope of George’s responsibility extends beyond the scope of Georg’s, both have the
39
40

Zimmerman 2002: 563.
Ibid.
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same non-zero degree of control over their character dispositions from which they form
the intention to kill their respective targets. According to Zimmerman, the fact that both
Georg and George have the same non-zero degree of control over their character
dispositions is enough to ensure that the counterfactual scenario in which Georg has
control over his character dispositions, actions, and effects is one in which Georg kills
Henrik in the same way George kills Henry. Moreover, Zimmerman believes that this
counterfactual similarity is enough to indicate that the two should be assessed identically.
The method Zimmerman uses to deal with circumstantial luck in the case at hand
is also capable of dealing with circumstantial luck in Nagel’s example where one of two
individuals disposed to become Nazi officers avoids doing so only by moving to
Argentina in 1930. According to Zimmerman, one who avoids becoming a Nazi officer
only by moving to Argentina is no less blameworthy than one who actually become a
Nazi officer, provided, of course, that the reason for one’s move is not to avoid becoming
a Nazi officer.41 Although there might be resistance to this claim, I believe that such
resistance might be alleviated in one of two ways. First, one could make the example
more precise. Second, rather than suggesting that the individual who moves to Argentina
is no less blameworthy than the Nazi officer, one could suggest that the Nazi officer is no
more blameworthy than the individual who moves to Argentina. When Emily Prentiss
(i.e., a character from Criminal Minds presented earlier), for example, recognizes that she
might have become a serial killer had she undergone the same events undergone by Jonny
41

An individual who recognizes that he or she is disposed to act wrongly in certain situations is right to
avoid such situations. Thus, an individual who recognizes that he or she is disposed to become a Nazi
officer and that becoming a Nazi officer is wrong is right to leaving Germany as the Nazis are coming to
power.
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McHale, she does not think of herself as being as guilty as him but rather thinks of him as
being as innocent as herself.
This example seems to vindicate the intuition that victims of circumstantial luck
are no more or less culpable than those who are not, and because I am inclined to think
that serial killers and Nazi officers are blameworthy rather than praiseworthy, I am also
inclined to think that those who avoid becoming Nazi officers only by moving to
Argentina are blameworthy rather than praiseworthy.

Constitutive Luck
The existence of constitutive luck makes it such that moral assessment should not
be influenced by one’s uncontrolled character dispositions. However, I see no reason
why moral assessment should not be influenced by one’s controlled character
dispositions or the counterfactual character dispositions one would have were one in
control of them.
To explain why this is, I want to look at another example similar to Zimmerman’s
original but altered in such a way that Georg and George are no longer assassins but
simply enemies of Henrik and Henry. In this new case, Georg is levelheaded such that,
when tormented by Henrik, he is unprovoked. George, however, is hotheaded such that,
when tormented by Henry, he is provoked.

Because of this constitutive difference

between the two, Georg does not form the intention to kill Henrik whereas George does
form the intention to kill Henry. The question Zimmerman faces is how to make a
comparative moral assessment of Georg and George when Georg, unlike George, refrains
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not only from killing or firing at but also from forming the intention to kill his
tormentor.42 Before responding to this question, however, I first want to get clear about
the example.
According to Zimmerman, Georg is levelheaded and George is hotheaded. Now,
if both individuals have control over these character traits, it would not be a case of
constitutive luck, for luck exists only if at least one of their character traits is beyond their
control. In order to preserve the similarity between this case and the previous cases, I
assume that Georg does not have control over his character trait of levelheadedness while
George does have control over his hotheadedness. 43
Like Zimmerman’s explanation of how to preserve moral assessment in the face
of resultant and circumstantial luck, Zimmerman’s explanation of how to preserve moral
assessment in the face of constitutive luck appeals to the counterfactual situation in which
Georg has control over the relevant character trait. If Georg would kill Henrik were he to
have control over the relevant character trait, then he is culpable for doing so.44 If Georg
would not kill Henrik were he to have control over the relevant character trait, then he is
not culpable for doing so.

42

Zimmerman 2002: 563-564.
Although Zimmerman does not spell out why Georg does not have control over whether he is
levelheaded, there are several reasons why Georg might not have control over his levelheadedness. For
example, it might be that Georg was raised by very levelheaded parents such that, even if he had been
genetically disposed to being hotheaded, he could not have helped but be levelheaded. It might also be that
Georg was genetically disposed to being levelheaded such that, even if he had been raised by hotheaded
parents, he could not have helped but be levelheaded. Because such cases are plausible, the suggestion that
Georg’s being levelheaded could be beyond his control is also plausible.
44
I assume that one’s constitution or character dispositions are ordinarily controlled through habituation,
but I imagine that there are cases in which one’s constitution changes more rapidly. If, for example, Jonny
McHale’s case is one of rapid character destruction, there are likely cases of rapid character construction
where one develops good dispositions from particularly significant events. To what degree individuals
have control over rapid character destruction and construction, however, is unclear.
43
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For the most part, the problems for moral assessment posed by constitutive luck
mirror those problems posed by resultant and circumstantial luck.

Consequently,

Zimmerman assumes that anyone who accepts his explanation of how to preserve moral
assessment in the face of resultant and circumstantial luck will also accept his
explanation of how to preserve moral assessment in the face of constitutive luck. While I
generally agree with that suggestion, I believe there are several concerns unique to
constitutive luck, which I will deal with in turn.
First, there is an issue that I touched on earlier when presenting constitutive luck,
specifically the fact that it comes in two distinct forms, internal and external. Internal
luck is a kind of constitutive luck that affects one’s attitudes without also affecting one’s
behaviors, so it plays a role in moral assessment only insofar as one’s attitudes play a role
in moral assessment. The case presented earlier in which an envious individual, Allen,
congratulates Brian is a case of attitudinal luck insofar as Allen’s envy, which is beyond
his control, influences the way in which he is morally assessed but does not influence his
behavior. Now, there might be some debate over the role attitudes play a role in moral
assessment. I would argue that an individual who is passed up for a deserved promotion
should be upset to some degree and that being upset to a lesser or greater degree is
morally wrong. It could also be argued, however, that being upset to a lesser or greater
degree is not morally wrong but wrong in some other sense. Regardless of which view is
correct, I think it is fair to say that one’s attitudes are subject to normative evaluation.
Thus, one is subject to internal luck anytime one’s attitude (e.g., the degree to which one
is upset) depends on factors beyond one’s control (e.g., one’s biological characteristics).
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External luck is a kind of constitutive luck that affects one’s behavior and
therefore plays a role in moral assessment insofar as one’s behavior plays a role in moral
assessment. Imagine, for example, a case in which an individual is taught by his or her
parents to have no regard for the property of others and is therefore disposed to steal.
This is a case of external luck insofar the individual’s dispositions, though beyond his or
her control, influence the way he or she is morally assessed. 45 Because behavior plays a
role in moral assessment, one is subject to external luck anytime one’s behavioral
dispositions depend on factors beyond one’s control (e.g., one’s upbringing).
As I have suggested, Nagel’s example of constitutive luck is one in which Allen’s
envy undermines his moral goodness and therefore seems to be a case of internal luck.
The example Zimmerman presents in response to Nagel, however, is one in which
George’s hotheadedness affects his behavior and is therefore a case of external luck.
Thus, whereas Allen is blameworthy on account of his envy, an internal disposition,
George is blameworthy on account of his hotheadedness, an external disposition. 46
Given this disanalogy, one might contend that Zimmerman’s response does not
get at Nagel’s worry. One might claim, for instance, that Zimmerman’s theory of moral
assessment fails because it is unable to differentiate between the laudability and
culpability of agents who perform similar actions but who have different attitudes. While
Zimmerman does not explain how to differentiate between the laudability and culpability
of agents who perform similar actions but who have different attitudes, it is relatively
45

Another case of external luck would be one in which an individual is taught to use violence to solve his
or her disagreements.
46
I imagine one could argue that hotheadedness is not an external disposition but an internal one, albeit an
internal disposition that also influences behavior. If that is the case, then there is no disanalogy between
the two examples.
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clear how Zimmerman would do so. Zimmerman could, for example, adapt his case in
such a way that Georg and George act similarly but form different attitudes, with Georg’s
attitude being appropriate but beyond his control and George’s attitude being
inappropriate and within his control. According to the model Zimmerman presents, the
relevant question is whether Georg’s attitude would be appropriate were it within his
control. If it would be, then Georg is not blameworthy for it, but if it would not be, then
Georg is blameworthy for it.
Given that there are two kinds of constitutive luck, internal and external, it can
legitimately be asked how the two relate to one another. In particular, it can be asked
whether attitudes cause, influence, or simply run alongside behaviors.

When I

distinguished internal and external luck, I assumed that the two could come apart. That
is, I assumed that certain attitudes (e.g., anger) are neither necessary nor sufficient for
related behaviors (e.g., acts of retribution). If that is the case, then a lack of control over
one’s attitudes is neither necessary nor sufficient for a lack of control over one’s
behaviors, and attitudes simply run alongside behaviors. Thus, it is possible to simply
separate internal luck from external luck. Now, it is possible that the two do not come
apart and that the distinction therefore collapses. Even if that is the case, however, I do
not think that speaks against Zimmerman’s account but only a certain way of applying it.
A second issue unique to constitutive luck is that its existence might entail the
existence of causal luck, for if one’s actions and the effects of one’s actions flow directly
from one’s character dispositions, then one who lacks control over one’s character
dispositions also lacks control over one’s actions and the effects of one’s actions.
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Obviously, Zimmerman need not admit that constitutive luck is that widespread, for just
as the fact that resultant luck exists from time to time does not imply that it exists all the
time, so too the fact that constitutive luck exists from time to time does not imply that it
exists all the time. In other words, the fact that some of one’s character dispositions are
beyond one’s control does not entail that all of one’s character dispositions are beyond
one’s control.

Causal Luck
If one’s actions and the effects of one’s actions flow directly from one’s character
dispositions and one’s character dispositions are determined by genetic, environmental,
or any other number of factors beyond one’s control, then one’s behavior is causally
determined, and one cannot be responsible for anything. Furthermore, if one cannot be
responsible for anything, then one cannot be laudable or culpable for any of one’s
behavior.
Establishing whether or not human behavior is causally determined is beyond the
scope of this paper. I am therefore content to admit that if human behavior is causally
determined, no one is laudable or culpable for anything. Although Zimmerman attempts
to avoid making this admission by contending that causally determined individuals are
responsible for the counterfactual behavior of their free counterparts, this contention is
dubious.47 While the truth of causal determinism does not rule out the possibility of

47

Zimmerman 2002: 567.
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one’s having free counterparts, 48 it is wrong to think that an actually existing, causally
determined individual could be responsible for the behavior of a possible counterpart.
Assuming that the control principle is true, moral responsibility requires control. Thus,
causally determined individuals, who have no control over their free counterparts, cannot
be responsible for the behavior of their free counterparts.
For example, Zimmerman would say that even if John Wilkes Booth is causally
determined to kill Abraham Lincoln, he is nevertheless culpable for doing so insofar as a
counterpart of his freely kills Lincoln in some possible world. If causal determinism is
true, however, then whether or not a counterpart of John Wilkes Booth’s freely kills
Lincoln in some possible world is beyond John Wilkes Booth’s control, and because one
cannot be responsible for what is beyond one’s control, John Wilkes Booth cannot be
responsible for his counterpart’s behavior.
Although I admit that if causal determinism is true, no one is laudable or culpable
for anything, I assume for the sake of argument that causal determinism is false. In fact,
there seem to be good reasons for doing so, for as Nagel admits, “We are unable to view
ourselves simply as portions of the world, and from inside we have a rough idea of the
boundary between what is us and what is not, what we do and what happens to us, what is
our personality and what is an accidental handicap.” 49 Although individuals may be
inclined to overestimate the amount of control they have over their character dispositions
and actions, it is counterintuitive to think that they do not have any such control.

48
49

Here I have followed Horgan 1979: 345-358.
Nagel 2007: 361.
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Objections50
The theory of moral assessment that has been presented is a counterfactual one,
and the purpose of advancing such a theory is to enable comparative moral assessment of
two or more individuals where at least one of them does not have control over some
characteristic of the world. I believe that the theory is up to that task. Nevertheless, there
are several objections one might make to the theory that I would like to address before
moving on.
First, there is the worry that counterfactual facts about one’s character, actions,
and effects are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to know. In response, I admit that it
may be impossible to know the kind of person one would be, the actions one would
perform, or the effects one would produce were one in control of those things. However,
I do not believe that it is essential that these facts be knowable in order for the theory in
question to be the appropriate method of moral assessment. That is, one need not know
how two agents stand in relation to one another morally in order for one to know that
there is a fact of the matter about how the two agents stand in relation to one another
morally. For example, one may not know whether there are more hairs on his head than
on his brother’s, but he nevertheless knows that either there are more hairs on his head
than on his brother’s or there are not. Similarly, one need not know whether Georg
would have fired at Henrik had an object not moved into his line of sight in order to know
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The preceding arguments were presented at the 2010 Ohio Philosophical Association’s Annual Meeting,
and the following objections came out of the ensuing discussion. I am therefore grateful to all those who
attended my presentation, particularly Brian Domino, for helping me develop my view.
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that there is a fact of the matter about whether Georg would have fired at Henrik had an
object not moved into his line of sight.
A second worry is that if causal determinism is false, there is no fact of the matter
whether Georg would have fired at Henrik had an object not moved into his line of sight.
While it seems to me that Georg would have fired at Henrik had an object not moved into
his line of sight, I admit that that intuition, at least in part, depends on the assumption that
George had already formed the intention to fire at Henrik. If I assume that George had
not already formed the intention to fire at Henrik, I am admittedly less likely to think that
there is a fact of the matter whether Georg would have fired at Henrik had an object not
moved into his line of sight.
Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that causal determinism need not be true in
order for there to be counterfactual facts. If you put someone in a situation other than the
one he or she is in, he or she is going to act, and that act is going to be determined by him
or her, not by physical facts about him or her. Imagine, for example, that Edward is
injured in a car accident but that had Edward not been injured in a car accident, he would
have come across a beggar. Now, Edward has character dispositions that influence how
he responds to beggars, and in most cases these dispositions are sufficient to determine
his response. For example, maybe he makes it a point to always give beggars money. If
that is the case, then there is a fact about what he would do in the counterfactual situation.
If, however, he does not make it a point to always give beggars money, then it is possible
that on the particular day in question his character dispositions do not incline him one
way or another. That is, maybe the degree to which he is disposed to give a particular
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beggar money is identical to the degree to which he is disposed not to give that beggar
money. Now, assuming that there is a fact of the matter whether Edward’s giving the
beggar money is right or wrong and that the scenario in question is one in which giving
the beggar money is right, then the more Edward’s character dispositions incline him to
give the beggar money, the better he is, qua moral agent. Consequently, if his character
dispositions do not incline him one way or another, Edward is neither the best nor the
worst agent he could be. He is somewhere between those extremes. Thus, even if there
is no fact of the matter whether Edward would give the beggar money, it is still possible
to compare his character dispositions to those of some other individual. If, for example,
that other individual is disposed to give the beggar money, Edward is worse than him or
her. If, however, that other individual is disposed not to give the beggar money, Edward
is better than him or her.
Maybe I have yet to alleviate the worry. Suppose one admits that the falsity of
causal determinism does not prevent certain facts about nearby possible worlds from
being true or that, even if it does, the falsity of causal determinism does not prevent the
possibility of morally assessing such worlds. One could still argue that the falsity of
causal determinism does prevent certain facts about remote possible worlds from being
true or that, even if it does not do that, it at least prevents the possibility of morally
assessing such worlds. The problem, one might argue, is that drastically changing an
individual’s constitution or circumstances makes that individual into an entirely different
person.
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Consider an example.

Imagine that Cassie and Danielle are raised in

extraordinarily different circumstances. Cassie is one of seven children cared for by her
single mother in a dilapidated apartment while Danielle is one of two children raised by
wealthy parents in suburbia. Cassie must lie, cheat, and steal to survive while Danielle
lives comfortably and is taught to share her wealth with others. Cassie and Danielle grow
up to have extremely different character dispositions. While one might want to say that
Danielle is a better person than Cassie, it is certainly not clear that Danielle is any more
praiseworthy than Cassie. In an attempt to determine who is more praiseworthy, one
would have to see how Cassie would respond to Danielle’s circumstances and vice versa.
The question, however, is how to drastically change Cassie’s circumstances without
destroying her identity. What is it about Cassie that must be kept constant?
I am inclined to believe that the only thing that would enable such a drastic
change without destroying Cassie’s identity would be something immaterial, her soul for
example. Although this suggestion is undoubtedly controversial, I take it that almost any
response to the problem of personal identity is similarly controversial.

Assuming,

therefore, that it is not impossible for Cassie to have an immaterial soul that informs her
body yet does not supervene on her body, 51 it is possible that Cassie’s soul could inform
some other body, specifically Danielle’s body. Thus, I contend that it is possible to
drastically changing one’s circumstances by without destroying one’s identity.
My response to the identity problem raises another worry, however, namely that
insofar as there are an infinite number of bodies that Cassie’s soul could inform, Cassie

51

According to Stump 2005: 191-216, Saint Thomas Aquinas held such a view.
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performs an infinite number of counterfactual acts.

The problem is that if Cassie

performs an infinite number of counterfactual acts and she is neither perfectly moral nor
perfectly immoral, then Cassie is both culpable and laudable for an infinite number of
counterfactual acts. Moreover, if that is the case, there is no way to differentiate Cassie’s
culpability or laudability from anyone else’s, unless of course there is someone who is
perfectly moral or perfectly immoral.
While I believe I must admit that both Cassie and Danielle would be responsible
for a great number of acts, I see no reason why I must admit that they would be
responsible for an infinite number of acts. It could be argued that once one evaluates
Cassie and Danielle in enough counterfactual scenarios, it will be clear which of the two
is morally better than the other in the same way that representative sampling makes it
clear which of two presidential candidates will win the upcoming election. It could also
be argued that there are a limited number of counterfactual scenarios in which individuals
such as Cassie and Danielle could find themselves.

That is, there may be some

metaphysical fact limiting the number of possible worlds in which they have
counterparts.
Speaking of moral perfection, a final worry might be that my theory makes it
impossible to be perfectly moral.

That is, if counterfactual facts influence moral

assessment and one cannot possibly avoid acting wrongly in some counterfactual
situation, then one cannot possibly be perfectly moral. Although some might believe this
consequence speaks against my view, I believe that it speaks in favor of it. According to
the control principle, moral responsibility and therefore moral assessment is incompatible
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with luck. Given how difficult it is to be perfectly moral in the actual world, however, it
is unimaginable that one could be perfectly moral without being lucky. Thus, because
luck is necessary for being perfectly moral but incompatible with moral assessment,
being perfectly moral is impossible.
To see this, consider an example. Following Kant, I assume that individuals are
required to develop their talents and share them with others.

Someone particularly

artistic, for example, is required to develop his or her artistic abilities and to share those
abilities with others (e.g., by displaying or selling his or her art). This is difficult,
however, for it is not only hard to determine the appropriate degree to which one ought to
develop one’s abilities, but it is also hard to be disciplined enough to succeed in
developing one’s abilities to the appropriate degree.52

Although I imagine some

individuals develop some of their talents to the appropriate degree, I doubt that any
individual develops all of his or her talents to the appropriate degree. If this is a moral
requirement, however, then it seems that all individuals fail to be perfectly moral. Now, I
do not doubt that it would be possible to develop all of one’s talents to the correct degree
but only that doing so would require luck. Thus, because luck, which is necessary for
developing all of one’s talents to the correct degree and therefore for being perfectly
moral, is incompatible with moral assessment, being perfectly moral is impossible.
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One may not be required to develop one’s abilities to an exact degree, but one is at least required to
develop one’s abilities to a certain range of degrees.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this section was to argue that the control principle need not be
abandoned in order to preserve the possibility of moral assessment and to explain how to
think about moral assessment given the existence of resultant, circumstantial, and
constitutive luck. The picture of moral assessment that has emerged is a counterfactual
one, which seems to capture the way comparative moral judgments are ordinarily made.
In the following section, I argue that this counterfactual account of moral assessment
provides reason to think that virtue ethical accounts of morality are superior to their
consequentialist and deontological counterparts. To do that, I lay out the respective
moral theories and describe how they might respond to the problems posed by resultant,
circumstantial, and constitutive luck.
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V. AN ARGUMENT FOR VIRTUE ETHICS
Earlier I asserted that the making of hypological judgments is necessary for the
making of aretaic and deontic judgments and therefore emphasized the role of
hypological judgments in moral assessment. I realize that one might object to that
assessment, contending that the making of aretaic judgments about virtue or deontic
judgments about right action is possible without the making of hypological judgments.
For example, one might claim that honesty is a virtue regardless of whether the individual
in question is responsible for his or her honesty. Similarly, one might claim that acts of
truth-telling are right regardless of whether individuals are responsible for them. Such
arguments, I believe, are doomed to fail. Take a case of truth-telling in which a teenager,
Erin, is the lone witnesses to a robbery carried out by her father. The prosecution needs
Erin’s testimony to convict her father, but Erin resists testifying against him in fear of
what her life would be like without her father. Given Erin’s unwillingness to confess, the
prosecution hooks her up to a machine that forces her to give an honest answer to any
question she is asked. When asked whether her father committed the robbery, Erin
unwillingly answers in the affirmative. If control is unnecessary for right action, then
Erin acts rightly. But Erin does not act rightly, not because she acts wrongly but because
her act is not the kind of thing that could be right or wrong.
While this example shows that right action requires control, I imagine one might
remain skeptical about whether virtue requires control. Illustrating that, however, is not
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much more difficult than illustrating that right action requires control. One need only
alter the previous example such that Erin is always hooked up to this device and therefore
always tells the truth. Consequently, Erin is reliably disposed to tell the truth, and
assuming that control is unnecessary for virtue, Erin has the virtue of honesty. But Erin
does not have the virtue of honesty, not because she is not reliably disposed to tell lies but
because her reliable disposition to tell the truth is not the kind disposition that could be
virtuous. Thus, both virtue and right action require control, and therefore the making of
hypological judgments is necessary for the making of aretaic and deontic judgments.

Consequentialism
In spite of the previous statement, moral theorists have historically paid relatively
little attention to hypological judgments, choosing instead to assume the existence of free
will and focusing their attention on determining the kind of person one should be and the
kinds of actions one should perform.

Over time, their efforts have produced three

preeminent moral theories, consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.
The first of these theories I want to address is consequentialism, which comes in a
variety of forms. Nevertheless, consequentialist theories are united in their agreement
that right action is action the effect of which is or is expected to be maximally valuable. 53
In other words, all consequentialist theories see action as valuable only insofar as it
produces the most good. The most prominent form of consequentialism is utilitarianism
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according to which happiness is the only good. Thus, utilitarians believe that agents are
virtuous and acts right iff they maximize happiness.
Although the simplicity of consequentialist theories (e.g., utilitarianism) makes
them attractive, consequentialist theories of moral assessment tend to produce
counterintuitive conclusions in cases of luck. Because such theories evaluate agents and
actions in terms of their effects and because the effects of an agent’s character
dispositions or actions are often beyond his or her control, consequentialist theories of
moral assessment base assessment on facts beyond an agent’s control.

Instead of

endorsing theories of moral assessment on which agents and actions are evaluated in
terms of their actual effects, some consequentialists endorse theories of moral assessment
on which agents and actions are evaluated in terms of their expected effects. While this
strategy initially seems promising, it fails to do much better than the original view. One
reason for this is that one’s expectations are no less subject to luck than one’s effects
are.54 That is, what one expects to happen as a result of one’s actions is going to depend
on one’s past experiences, and one’s past experiences, as I have argued, are no more
within one’s control than one’s effects.
One might try to salvage consequentialism by adopting a theory of moral
assessment on which virtue and right action depend not on the effects expected by
ordinary agents but on the effects expected by an ideal observer (e.g., a maximally
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rational or omniscient agent).55 On such a view, one is virtuous or acts rightly by
determining what action an ideal observer would expect to have the best effects and then
performing that action. My worry, however, is that this is no longer a consequentialist
view, for what seems to make an action right is not the fact that it maximizes good but
the fact that it meets certain criteria. If I am correct that what makes an action right on
this view is the fact that it is expected to maximize goods from the perspective of an ideal
observer, then what makes an action right is the fact that it meets certain criteria. If,
however, what makes an action right is the fact that it meets certain criteria, then what
makes an action right is a fact about the act itself, not about its consequences, a tenet of
deontological views. If I am wrong and what makes an action right on this view is the
fact that it maximizes good, then the view will describe resultantly lucky action as right
when it should be described as wrong.
I imagine that one could argue that what makes an action right is that it both
meets certain criteria, a fact about the act, and maximizes good, a fact about the act’s
consequences.

This position, I imagine, could accurately be described as a

consequentialist view, but it has started to look like a virtue ethical one.

What

differentiates this view from a virtue ethical one, I contend, is the fact that does not
appear to concern itself with counterfactuals circumstances. Thus, virtuous agents on this
account need only meet certain criteria and maximize goods in the actual world, not
nearby possible ones. This will be a problem given the existence of circumstantial luck,
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for this view will describe circumstantially lucky individuals as virtuous when, in fact,
they should not be.
In “Uneasy Virtue,” Julia Driver advances a consequentialist theory on which “a
virtue is a character trait that produces more good (in the actual world) than not
systematically.”56 Thus, on Driver’s account, what it means for one to be virtuous is for
one to have character traits that systematically produce more good that not in the actual
world. Conversely, what it means for one to be vicious is for one to have character traits
that systematically produce more evil than not in the actual world. According to Driver,
therefore, anyone who has traits that produce more good than not in the actual world is
virtuous, and anyone who has traits that produce more evil than not in the actual is
vicious.
One problem with Driver’s account is that agents like Danielle who share with
others are deemed virtuous even if their disposition to share with others is beyond their
control.57 To illustrate the worry, assume that Danielle is disposed to sharing with others
only because of certain genetic facts about her or because she was raised in a particularly
lucky environment. Moreover, assume that had she been raised in a neutral environment
over which she had more control she would have developed dispositions to lie, cheat, and
steal. Given this information, one is unlikely to consider Danielle virtuous. In fact, one
might even consider Danielle vicious. Thus, Driver’s account, which deems Danielle
virtuous, assesses Danielle inappropriately.
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Another problem with Driver’s account is that agents like Cassie who lie, cheat,
and steal are deemed vicious even if their lying, cheating, and stealing is beyond their
control.58 To illustrate this worry, assume that Cassie is disposed to lying, cheating, and
stealing only because of certain genetic facts about her or because she was raised in a
particularly unlucky environment. Moreover, assume that had she been raised in a
neutral environment over which she had more control she would have developed the
disposition to share with others. Given this information, one is unlikely to consider
Cassie vicious. In fact, one might even consider Cassie virtuous. Thus, Driver’s account,
which deems Cassie vicious, assesses Cassie inappropriately.
Given what has been said, it should be clear that consequentialist theories of
moral assessment praise lucky agents and blame unlucky ones, thereby violating the
control principle. While one might attempt to save consequentialism by grounding moral
assessment in expected effects or the expected effects of an ideal observer rather than
actual effects, such views are more appropriately grouped with deontological views than
with other consequentialist views. There is, however, another way one might try to save
consequentialism, namely by arguing that moral assessment should be based not on all of
one’s effects but on those effects that are within one’s control. Such a strategy was
suggested earlier during the discussion of resultant luck, and although it would avoid
some of the problems that plague Driver’s theory, it fails to provide much information on
which to base moral assessment.
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Ultimately, the existence of luck rules out or at least threatens to rule out the
possibility that consequentialism is the best moral theory.

However, the fact that

consequentialism is not the best moral theory does not indicate that moral assessment
should ignore the effects of actions. Because the effects of action are an important if not
essential element of morality, they ought to be taken into account. That being said, it is
not always an action’s actual effects but sometimes its counterfactual effects that should
serve as the basis for moral assessment. Thus, the problem with consequentialist theories
of moral assessment is not that they focus on the effects of actions but rather that they
focus on the actual effects of actions.

Deontology
Although deontology, like consequentialism, comes in a variety of forms, its
defenders generally agree that right action is not instrumentally but intrinsically
valuable.59 More specifically, deontologists hold that the right action is that which is in
accordance with a rule or set of rules and that wrong action, conversely, is that which
violates that rule or set of rules. The most prominent form of deontology is that proposed
by Kant, who argues that an action has moral worth only if it is performed from duty and
therefore that its worth is not derived from its effects but from “the maxim according to
which the action is determined.”60 According to Kant, those maxims that confer moral
worth to the actions they determine are those that are universalizable. Thus, Kant’s
categorical imperative requires one never to act “except in such a way that [one] can also
59
60

Shafer-Landau 2007(b): 521.
Kant 1993: 12-13.

Spelman, Jonathan, 2010, UMSL, p. 50
will that [one’s] maxim should become a universal law.” 61 Given this account of right
action, a virtuous agent is one who acts from the categorical imperative and thereby
possesses the only thing that is good without qualification, a good will. 62
One attractive feature of deontological theories like Kant’s is the ease with which
they deal with cases of luck, particularly cases of resultant luck. Because Kantian moral
assessment is grounded in what motivates action rather than its effects, effects do not
play any role in Kantian moral assessment. Furthermore, because effects do not play a
role in Kantian moral assessment, resultant luck does not affect the way Kantian
deontologists assess agents.
Consider Zimmerman’s example of resultant luck in which Georg’s attempt on
Henrik’s life fails when his bullet impacts a passing bird. Furthermore, imagine that
Georg’s killing the bird is an exceptionally good outcome because the bird is either
particularly troublesome or particularly tasty. 63 Whereas a consequentialist might say
that such action is right on account of the fact that it maximizes some good, a Kantian
deontologist will say that such action is wrong on account of the fact that the maxim of
Georg’s act is not universalizable. Assuming that Georg’s act is, in fact, wrong, the
Kantian assesses his act appropriately while the consequentialist does not. This example
suggests that deontological theories are better than consequentialist ones at assessing
cases of resultant luck.
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Although deontological theories are better than consequentialist ones at assessing
cases of resultant luck, they are not necessarily better than consequentialist ones at
assessing cases of circumstantial luck. Because one’s actions, like the effects of one’s
actions, are often beyond one’s control, deontological theories that ground moral
assessment in action itself do so improperly in cases where one’s actions are beyond
one’s control. Nevertheless, Kantians may be able to avoid this criticism in certain cases
insofar as they ground moral assessment in one’s will rather than one’s actions.
According to Kant, actions derive their value from the value of the will that produces
them. Therefore, actions are valuable only if they are produced by a will that acts from
duty. In Zimmerman’s example of circumstantial luck, both Georg and George intend, or
will, the death of their respective targets. While George succeeds, Georg fails because of
the circumstances in which he finds himself. Even if the example is altered such that
circumstantial luck not only prevents Georg from attempting to kill Henrik but also
causes him to perform a particularly appropriate act, Kantians remain capable of
condemning George on account of the fact that his action is produced by a will that aims
at killing Henrik, an act the maxim of which is not universalizable.
Even if Kantians are able to assess agents appropriately in some cases of
circumstantial luck (e.g., Zimmerman’s), they are not able to assess agents appropriately
in all cases of circumstantial luck. In Nagel’s case of circumstantial luck, for example,
one is asked to compare the morality of an individual who becomes an officer in Nazi
Germany with the morality of another individual who, though he does not become an
officer in Nazi Germany, fails to do so only because he leaves Germany for business
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reasons in 1930. In Zimmerman’s example, Kantians can blame Georg because, although
he does not kill Henrik, his will aims at killing Henrik, an act the maxim of which is not
universalizable.

In Nagel’s example, however, Kantians cannot employ the same

strategy, for the individual who leaves Germany for business reasons never aims at any
action the maxim of which is not universalizable. Thus, although such an individual is
culpable for his disposition to become a Nazi officer, Kantians have no way of explaining
his culpability.
Consequently, although Kantians are capable of dealing with cases of resultant
and some cases of circumstantial luck, they are incapable of dealing with all cases of
circumstantial luck. What is more, they are also incapable of dealing with cases of
constitutive luck, the kind of luck that exists when one’s attitudes or behaviors are
influenced by factors beyond one’s control. Because Kant worked under the assumption
that individuals have free will, he assumed that they are therefore capable of doing
whatever they please. Nagel’s arguments for the existence of constitutive luck suggests
otherwise, however, and thereby undermines Kant’s view.

Assuming that Nagel is

correct, agents are not necessarily responsible for what they intend, or will, and thus
Kantians, who base moral assessment on the will, assess agents inappropriately in cases
of constitutive luck.
The existence of circumstantial and constitutive luck therefore rules out, or at
least threatens to rule out, the possibility that deontology could be the best moral theory.
An additional problem with deontology, however, is the fact that it does not place enough
value on the effects of actions. Some deontological theories (e.g., divine command
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theory) completely ignore the effects of actions. Other deontological theories, though
they do not completely ignore the effects of actions, attend to the wrong ones. Kant’s
theory, for example, considers the counterfactual effects of universalized maxims to
determine whether actions performed from such maxims results in inconsistency. The
problem with this is that the counterfactuals effects of universalized maxims are not or
are at least not obviously as informative as they should be about an action’s rightness.
While I am willing to admit that actions performed from maxims the universalization of
which results in inconsistency are wrong, actions need not be performed from maxims the
universalization of which results in inconsistency in order to be wrong. For example,
fulfilling one’s promises is ordinarily right, and it does not seem that any inconsistency
would result if everyone fulfilled their promises. Nevertheless, imagine a case in which
an individual promises to meet a friend for lunch at a particular time but comes across a
drowning stranger on the way. Even if the individual must miss lunch in order to save
the drowning stranger, the individual should nevertheless do so. On Kant’s theory,
however, it is at least permissible for the individual to ignore the drowning stranger in
order to fulfill his promise.
In the end, I believe that there is something correct about the consequentialist
suggestion that virtue, vice, rightness, and wrongness are grounded in the effects of
action. Thus, a deontological theory that ignores the effects of action could not be the
best moral theory. The problem, however, is that few deontological theories value the
effects of actions and those that do value the wrong ones. As a result, deontological
theories are not only incapable of avoiding problems posed by cases of circumstantial and
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constitutive luck but also fail to attend to the effects of actions, which should play an
important role in moral assessment.

Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is the last of the three preeminent moral theories, and like the others,
it too comes in a variety of forms. What unites its proponents, according to Russ ShaferLandau, is the belief that actions are right “because they exemplify virtuous character
traits, and not because they conform to some already-specified moral rule.”64 Thus,
whereas consequentialists determine right action by evaluating an act’s effects and
deontologists determine right action by evaluating an act’s relationship to a rule or set of
rules, virtue ethicists determine right action by evaluating the character traits that produce
it.
As a result, determining whether certain actions are right on a particular virtue
ethical theory requires determining what character traits are virtuous. According to
Aristotle, virtuous character traits are means between vices. Courage, for instance, is
described by Aristotle as “a mean with respect to things that inspire confidence or fear”
that lies between rashness and cowardice.65

Temperance is similarly described by

Aristotle as “a mean with regard to pleasures” that lies between self-indulgence and
insensibility.66
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Although this information is helpful for determining the kind of thing virtuous
character traits are, it remains unclear how to find the mean between any two vices.
Where, for example, is the mean between rashness and cowardice or between selfindulgence and insensibility? Although Aristotle does not answer that question directly,
his theory seems to be one on which virtuous character traits are behavioral dispositions
which not only aim at but also bring about goods. This reading of Aristotle is endorsed
by Driver who writes, “A view such as the one advocated by Aristotle is arguably a
mixed view. Internal factors, such as aiming at virtue for its own sake, or acting with
some correct conception of the good or noble, and so on are necessary to virtue but not
sufficient. Some external requirement also exists in that for a trait to really be a virtue, it
must somehow contribute to human flourishing.”67
On Aristotle’s view, one who is courageous, for example, avoids rashness by
recognizing the value of life and avoids cowardice by recognizing that there are things
other than life that are valuable. Similarly, one who is temperate avoids insensibility by
recognizing the value of pleasure and avoids self-indulgence by recognizing that there are
things other than pleasure that are valuable. The virtuous individual is therefore one who
both recognizes goods as such and recognizes how their values relate to one another.
This is not sufficient for virtue, however, for as Driver’s quote suggests, a trait must not
only aim at but also bring about a good in order to be virtuous. Thus, in “A Virtue
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Ethical Account of Right Action,” Christine Swanton contends that acts are virtuous if
and only if they are both performed from virtue and hit their targets. 68
If virtuous agents are those who have virtuous character traits and virtuous
character traits are behavioral dispositions that not only aim at but also bring about
certain goods, then virtuous agents are those who have behavioral dispositions to aim at
and bring about certain goods. Thus, virtue ethics is by its very nature a counterfactual
theory of moral assessment, for insofar as virtuous agents are those disposed to bring
about certain goods, determining whether or not one is virtuous requires evaluating both
one’s actual and counterfactual behavior.
According to virtue ethicists, what is necessary for virtue is not that agents
maximize good in the actual world but that agents maximize good in the counterfactual
worlds in which they have control over their character dispositions, actions, and effects.
Thus, where consequentialists are bad at assessing agents in cases of luck because they
evaluate actual effects, virtue ethicists are good at assessing agents in cases of luck
because they evaluate counterfactual effects, specifically counterfactual effects that are
not influenced by factors beyond one’s control.
To illustrate this difference, I want to briefly compare Driver’s consequentialist
view to my virtue ethical view. According to Driver, agents are virtuous if and only if
they have character traits that systematically maximize good in the actual world.
According to me, agents are virtuous if and only if they have character traits that
systematically maximize good across counterfactual worlds. Because it is possible for
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someone who is lucky to have character traits that systematically maximize good in the
actual world, it possible for someone who is lucky to be virtuous on Driver’s account.
Because it is impossible for someone who is lucky to have character traits that
systematically maximize good across counterfactual worlds, it is impossible for someone
who is lucky to be virtuous on my account. Thus, Driver is forced to abandon the control
principle while I am not.
I should also note that the virtue ethicist’s use of counterfactuals allows him or
her to take the effects of one’s actions into consideration when conducting moral
assessment. So, whereas deontologists must eliminate the consequentialist requirement
that the production of good effects is necessary for virtue in order to avoid the problems
posed by luck, virtue ethicists need not eliminate the consequentialist requirement that
the production of good effects is necessary for virtue in order to avoid such problems.
Although virtue ethics avoids the objections I have leveled against
consequentialism and deontology, it is not therefore immune to criticism. For example,
John Doris, in “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics,” uses empirical evidence to argue
that stable character dispositions (i.e., virtues) do not exist. 69 As I see it, Doris’ worry is
simply that individuals have less control over their character dispositions than virtue
ethicists ordinarily assume, a worry similar to Nagel’s. Thus, while I am willing to admit
that Doris’ argument threatens a central tenet of virtue ethical theories (viz., the
assumption that individuals have control over their character dispositions), I do not think
it threatens anything I have said.
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VI. CONCLUSION
I began by presenting the problem of moral luck as posed by Thomas Nagel and
arguing that, given the existence of resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive luck, one
hoping to preserve the possibility of moral assessment must either reject the control
principle or accept a counterfactual theory of moral assessment. I then drew from the
work of Michael J. Zimmerman to construct and defend such a theory, thereby preserving
the control principle.
In closing, I have explained why one who accepts a counterfactual theory of
moral assessment should prefer virtue ethical accounts of morality to consequentialist or
deontological accounts. In particular, I have argued that consequentialism, on which
virtuous agents are those who maximize good in the actual world, falls prey to problems
posed by luck. I have also argued that deontology, on which virtuous agents are those
who act in accordance with a rule or set of rules, is forced to ignore the effects of action.
Because the best moral theory should neither fall prey to problems posed by luck nor
ignore the effects of action, I contend that virtue ethics, on which virtuous agents are
those disposed to both aim at and bring about certain goods, is the best moral theory.
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